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Abstract
We conduct empirical analysis on the relation between firm value and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) using 134,823 observations of 2542 firms across 44 countries from 
2009 to 2014. We find that the firm value is positively related to the overall CSR score of 
the firm. At a more granular level, we find that good environmental score is positively 
related to the firm value and good social and governance scores are negatively related to 
the firm value. Since these firms operate in different institutional frameworks, we explore 
whether the institutional voids—the absence of institutions or intermediaries that are 
instrumental in supporting business operations in a country—may result in greater firm 
valuation for its CSR and vice versa. Our results show that firms’ environmental scores 
and social scores receive higher valuation in countries with weaker institutions. Overall, 
our findings suggest that CSR creates value for firms by filling institutional voids in their 
home country.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, firm value, institutional theory, institutional 
voids
1. Introduction
In recent years, an increasing focus has been placed on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
strategies as an integral function of business (e.g., [1–3]). A joint study by the United Nations 
Global Compact and Accenture in 2010 found that 93% of the 766 CEOs as participants 
around the globe believe that CSR will be an “important” or “very important” factor for their 
organizations’ future success [4]. The Forum for Socially Responsible Investing in the United 
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States (USSIF) also showed that socially responsible investing (SRI) currently expanded to 
6.57 trillion in 2014, representing 17.9% of all assets under management in the United States 
(USSIF, [5]). Moreover, developments such as the signature of the Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI) agreement by major market players and the increasing institutionalization 
of B Corp as a legal entity class in the United States (e.g., [6]) serve to showcase CSR’s increas-
ing relevance in modern business world.
Despite a surging interest in CSR, a seemingly fundamental question remains unresolved—
does CSR create value for firm? Traditional shareholder theory suggests that CSR can create 
value only if it increases the firm’s expected future cash flows and reduces firm risk (e.g., 
[2, 7, 8]). In contrast, opponents predict that CSR is inherently value destroying, driven by 
selfish motives (e.g., [9]). We aim to reconcile the differences in the literature by performing a 
comprehensive cross-country empirical study on CSR and firm valuation relation.
We use the international CSR data from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), which 
is an independent rating agency with extensive experience in analyzing firms based on a 
wide range of CSR dimension assessments. Firms are rated on their environmental, social, 
and governance (ESG) performance, by receiving numerical ESG index scores (from 1 to 100, 
with 100 being the highest). The MSCI’s ESG ratings have been extensively used in recent 
studies (e.g., [7, 10]). We measure firm value by Tobin’s Q. This measure is popular because it 
captures both the expected tangible and intangible value of the firm (e.g., [11–13]). Our final 
sample consists of 134,823 monthly observations of 2542 companies across 44 countries and 
128 industries from 2009 to 2014.
Our first result shows that CSR is associated with higher firm value on average, but the eco-
nomic significance is small. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the ESG score 
will lead to an increase in Tobin’s Q by 28 basis points. This is about 0.17% of the mean value 
of Tobin’s Q measure at 1.63. The weak economic result prompts us to delve into three subdi-
mensions of the ESG scores (environmental, social, and governance scores).
Our second result shows that the environment score is positively and significantly related to firm 
value, whereas the social and governance scores are both negatively and significantly related to 
firm value at the 1% significance level. Although similar findings have been documented in the 
United States (e.g., [2, 14]), our results have expanded the research scope to 49 countries.
Given that our sample firms span across different countries, we wonder whether the CSR-
firm value relation is affected by different institutional environments that these firms oper-
ate in. The literature has provided some indications on the relation between firm valuation 
and institutional frameworks. For example, the quality of country-level governance is shown 
to have a material impact on financial markets and firm-level corporate policy (e.g., [15]). 
Firms in countries with better investor protection have easier access to external funding (e.g., 
Doidge et al. [16, 17, 18]). Moreover, investors seem to take into account environmental and 
social risks when making investment decisions (e.g., [19, 20]). Since firms are not operating in 
a vacuum and are affected by the institutional framework within their home countries, same 
argument may apply to the CSR-firm valuation relation. Our empirical setting allows for a 
deep investigation since we have firms from many different countries.
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Our third main result reveals how the CSR and firm value relation changes in the presence 
of different institutional voids in financial, economic, and governmental institutions (e.g., 
[21, 22]). We find that the valuation effect of CSR is significantly more pronounced in weaker 
institutional frameworks and vice versa.
We also perform several robustness tests. First, we examine the possibility that our observa-
tions are driven by market reaction rather than material value creation. We find no evidence 
for reversions in firm value over a longer time frame, which suggests that our findings are 
driven by material value creation. Second, we examine the possibility that our findings are 
driven by firms in regulated industries or “sin” firms (e.g., [3]). As such, we rerun our mod-
els excluding firms operating under regulated industries (e.g., [11]), which constitute bank-
ing, energy, insurance, telecommunication, transportation, and utility companies, and those 
under the Triumvirate of Sin (e.g., [23]), which constitute alcohol, gambling, and tobacco com-
panies. Our main results remain robust.
Our study contributes to three strands of the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
our study is one of the first studies to explore the CSR-firm value relation on an international 
scale. We integrate an institution-based view with an institutional void perspective, using a 
large panel dataset. Indeed, preexisting studies of CSR have generally been conducted in a 
single country with a dearth of researchers investigating cross-country effects (e.g., [11, 24]). 
Secondly, consistent with literature, we provide evidence for the notion of CSR as value cre-
ation, drawing on institutional void theory to contextualize the CSR-valuation relation by 
observing it across different socioeconomic and political regimes. Lastly, our study provides 
a deeper understanding on the underlying mechanisms through which CSR actions lead to 
particular outcomes at an institutional level (e.g., [1, 24]).
2. Literature review
2.1. Existing theories on CSR-firm value relationship
Traditionally, researchers believe that the responsibility of a business is “to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules 
of the game and engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud” [25]. 
This implies that a firm’s voluntary pursuance of CSR incurs unnecessary costs and thus 
reduces its financial performance, resulting in additional firm risk borne by shareholders. A 
firm’s spending on CSR is a manifestation of managerial agency, as managers use corporate 
resources to confer managerial benefits instead of adding to firm value (e.g., [10, 26]).
On the other hand, Freeman’s [27] seminal stakeholder theory argues that businesses do not exist 
as isolated units in a vacuum, and, thus, the presence and interactions with other actors1 who are 
able to affect the firm follows that an increase in firms’ CSR will result in improved stakeholder 
1As Jiao [12] has noted, there has been an ongoing debate regarding an accurate depiction and definition of the term 
stakeholders (e.g., [25]). However, Jiao [12] concedes that studies generally consider employees, customers, suppliers, 
governmental bodies, competitors, and investors as notable stakeholders, among others.
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relationships, eventually resulting in a better financial performance (e.g., [7, 28, 29]) and reduc-
tions in firm risk (e.g., [20]). It follows that stakeholder welfare is thus a means for firms to invest 
in intangible assets that would add value to the firm (e.g., [13]). Notably, Porter and Kramer [8] 
suggest that valuable benefits are created when firms approach societal issues from a “shared 
value perspective” and invent new ways of operation to address them, which could manifest 
through various avenues, such as a reduction in transaction costs [30] or the creation of nouveau 
market opportunities [31]. This notion of CSR as a strategic advantage is supported by a variety 
of studies (e.g., [32, 33]). For example, some scholars have drawn links between a firm’s CSR and 
its resulting capital structure (e.g., [34]), fewer capital constraints [14], lower costs of capital (e.g., 
[20]), or increased employee attractiveness (e.g., Greening and Turban [35]).
The literature has also put forward conceptual theories on how CSR can positively affect the 
firm. Firstly, the risk management theory proposes that the pursuance of CSR has the ability to 
mitigate the risk experienced by firms (e.g., [20]) by being less prone to social and regulatory 
changes, for example. Secondly, the shunned stock theory assumes that socially responsible 
investors select assets on different reasons unrelated to profit motives (i.e., a “value-driven” 
investor). This preferential selection then results in investors requiring a return premium due 
to the increased risk that nonsocially responsible firms bear (e.g., [23, 36]). This preference 
for socially responsible firms also manifests as an increase in investor demand, leading to a 
premium in firm valuation (e.g., [37]), and may also improve firm performance via avenues 
such as a more favorable cost of equity (e.g., [14]).
Researchers who are in favor of a neutral relationship between CSR and firm performance 
argue that the relationship between a firm’s corporate social performance and the benefit that 
it imparts (e.g., financial performance and stock price) is complex in nature rather than strictly 
positive or negative (e.g., [38, 39]). Along this train of thought, McWilliams and Siegel [40] 
outline a supply and demand model of CSR, concluding that each firm will select an optimal 
level of CSR at each point in time determined via cost–benefit analyses.
2.2. Empirical evidence on CSR-firm value relationship
Empirically, investigations into the CSR-firm value relation have resulted in a series of mixed 
findings. However, multiple literature reviews suggest that the CSR-firm performance rela-
tionship is generally positive in nature (e.g., [1, 28, 29]), such that higher levels of CSR can 
result in lower idiosyncratic risk (e.g., [41]), higher market to book ratios (e.g., [37]), and 
higher valuations (e.g., [13]).
The large degree of variability inherent in the literature could be symptomatic to a suite of 
underlying causes. For example, market actors could disagree on the inherent value of a 
firm’s CSR and its corresponding impact (e.g., [2, 23]) or fail to fully incorporate the value 
of a firm’s intangible assets into their valuations (e.g., [42]). Other scholars suggest that these 
results could be due to the time lag between the operationalization of CSR and the realization 
of its benefits (e.g., [43]), with Brammer and Millington [26] noting that firms with unusually 
poor social performance do best in the short run and unusually good social performance do 
best over longer time horizons, alongside Derwall et al. [36] who observed that the market 
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systematically undervalues how a firm’s CSR can influence its expected future cash flows. 
The opacity of results could also reflect the inherent difficulty in evaluating and quantifying 
CSR (e.g., [44]), such that conflicting findings across studies may arise through sampling or 
measurement errors (e.g., [45]) or a lack of sophistication when measuring stakeholder effects 
(e.g., [28, 46]). Researchers could also be operating under the assumption of a level of firm 
homogeneity, disregarding important granular firm-level or individual-level variations that 
may be mediators or moderators of CSR (e.g., [47, 48]). Last but not least, scholars suggest 
that this variation points toward the significant knowledge gap that still exists regarding the 
mechanisms through which CSR affects the firm (e.g., [1]).
2.3. The impact of country-level institutional frameworks
Institutional environments matter for firms because they influence the firm’s costs and ben-
efits associated with pursuing various activities (e.g., [17, 21]). In particular, the literature 
highlights the importance of three country-level institution frameworks, namely, financial, 
economic, and governmental institutions.
First, firms are affected by the degree of financial market development. In this case, firms 
without access to developed financial markets may face capital constraints, such that firms 
may be forced to forgo worthwhile investments (e.g., [14]). Further, firms operating in mar-
kets that are financially globalized have superior access to foreign capital markets and are less 
dependent on the extent of financial market development in their own country. For example, 
Doidge et al. (2007) show that firms find it costlier to improve corporate governance in coun-
tries with poorly developed financial markets.
Second, firms are affected by the degree of economic development. For example, firms situ-
ated in countries lacking in critical infrastructure (i.e., security services, telecommunication, 
utility services, etc.) might find themselves unable to pursue beneficial opportunities due to 
these constraints (e.g., [19]). Another example is the effect of an underdeveloped labor mar-
ket, where a labor market in short supply of skilled employees or lacking contract-enforcing 
mechanisms puts firms who are unable to obtain and retain a robust workforce at a competi-
tive disadvantage (e.g., [21, 22]).
Lastly, firms are affected by the degree of governmental institution development. For example, 
government ineffectiveness can significantly affect firms through poor regulation quality and lax 
contract enforcement. This may subsequently limit firm innovation, cause the exploitations of 
companies, or discourage firms from engaging in potentially beneficial ventures (e.g., [8, 21, 49]).
2.4. Hypothesis development
In summary, extant research to date on both the theoretical and empirical fronts has yet to 
converge toward a consensus on the underlying mechanisms that link CSR with its observed 
outcomes (e.g., [28, 29]). While theoretical links between CSR and firm value have been estab-
lished, whether or not this phenomenon is reproduced in different institutional frameworks 
remains an empirical question. Thus, we hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis 1: CSR creates value for the firm.
Scholars have also put forth evidence that CSR is heterogeneous in nature such that the inher-
ent dimensionality of CSR has implications for value creation (e.g., [2, 13]). Thus, we hypoth-
esize that:
Hypothesis 2: The CSR-valuation relation is heterogeneous in nature and CSR dimension is dependent, 
such that there is significant heterogeneity in valuation effects across different groups of stakeholders.
Khanna and Palepu [21] introduce the notion of institutional voids, which they define as the absence 
of institutions or intermediaries that are instrumental in supporting business operations in the con-
text of a country’s capital, labor, and product markets, its regulatory system, and its mechanisms of 
contract enforcement. For example, in an environment with underdeveloped financial institutions, 
the absence of mechanisms such as financial reportage, watchdog oversight, and analyst coverage 
works to increase informational asymmetry and decrease market efficiency. It follows that these 
financial markets will experience a decrease in investor willingness, negatively impacting capi-
tal access and forcing firms to seek alternative means (e.g., [50]). Similarly, an environment with 
underdeveloped economic institutions may force firms to find innovative ways to obtain skilled 
labor. Anecdotally, Khanna and Palepu [21] describe how Microsoft was compelled to collaborate 
with local firms and other stakeholders to aid the development of China’s software industry and 
subsequently demonstrated how this has led to significant benefits for the firm. Lastly, an envi-
ronment with underdeveloped governmental institutions might require firms to leverage their 
relationship with the government and reputation established by prior dealings, as they cannot 
rely on the robustness of the judicial system. Indeed, Khanna and Palepu [49] theorize that a key 
motivation behind a firm’s engagement in CSR arises from a need to fill these institutional voids to 
subsequently allow their business to thrive in these markets. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: The CSR-valuation relation is moderated by the institutional frameworks that firms 
operate in, such that the presence of greater (lesser) institutional voids in financial, economic, and 
governmental institutions will result in a greater (lesser) valuation effect.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
To investigate our hypotheses, we start by extracting all firm-level constituents of the MSCI AC 
World Index, which captures large and medium market capitalization stocks of both developed 
and emerging market countries, on a monthly basis for the time period of 2009 to 2014. We then 
extract firm-level characteristics from FactSet Research Systems (hereafter, FactSet) and merge 
this database with MSCI’s ESG database. To be included in our dataset, we require firms to have 
non-missing ESG scores. We also drop firms from Taiwan for consistency across our analyses, 
as the World Bank does not report important country-level statistics for Taiwan.2 Finally, we 
only retain firms that have enough available data to construct control variables. This procedure 
yields 134,823 monthly observations of 2542 companies across 44 countries and 128 industries.
2https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114933-where-are-your-data-on-taiwan/, retrieved on 30 
March 2015
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To validate the significance of cross-country variation valuation exposure to CSR, we observe 
the results of our investigations under differing institutional and macroeconomic conditions 
in later tests. In this study, we use MSCI’s market classification criteria, which segregate our 
sample of 44 countries into 23 developed markets and 21 emerging markets. Table 1 provides 
the number of firms by country.
For our analyses, we exploit a firm-level measurement of how much CSR a firm undergoes 
to empirically test our hypotheses. The source of this data is MSCI’s ESG database, which 
independently rates firms on their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance, 
Developed markets Emerging markets
Country Freq. Firms Percentage (%) Country Freq. Firms Percentage (%)
AUS 4416 85 4.40 BRA 3810 87 11.01
AUT 550 11 0.55 CHL 1143 21 3.30
BEL 794 14 0.79 CHN 4576 84 13.23
CAN 6077 118 6.07 COL 552 11 1.60
CHE 2109 38 2.11 CZE 204 3 0.59
DEU 3046 56 3.04 EGY 433 10 1.25
DNK 741 17 0.74 GRC 414 11 1.20
ESP 1632 32 1.62 HUN 248 4 0.72
FIN 983 17 0.98 IDN 1410 27 4.08
FRA 4705 80 4.70 IND 4011 84 11.59
GBR 6208 122 6.17 KOR 5681 104 16.42
HKG 1808 33 1.81 MAR 117 3 0.34
IRL 279 5 0.27 MEX 1461 30 4.22
ISR 733 15 0.73 MYS 2107 46 6.09
ITA 1672 36 1.67 PER 71 2 0.21
JPN 20,381 346 20.34 PHL 779 19 2.25
NLD 1324 25 1.32 POL 1049 26 3.03
NOR 468 8 0.47 RUS 1093 23 3.16
NZL 341 8 0.34 THA 1073 24 3.10
PRT 417 9 0.41 TUR 1285 25 3.71
SGP 1817 31 1.81 ZAF 3078 55 8.90
SWE 1925 32 1.93
USA 37,802 705 37.73
Total 100,228 1843 100 Total 34,595 699 100
This table displays the number of firms by country for the time period of 2009 to 2014. The sample includes all firms 
extracted from the MSCI AC World Index between 2009 and 2014 with sufficient firm-level and CSR data.
Table 1. The list of firms in each country.
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assigning them a numerical ESG index score (from 1 to 100, with 100 being the highest). 
MSCI’s ESG constructs indices of sustainable investment value and risk factors of more than 
6300 public corporations worldwide using a specialized list of 150 RiskMetrics adjusted for 
various markets, regional, ownership, or sector differences.3 MSCI only considers CSR issues 
that have a material impact on the firm, implying that the index score parallels the firm’s 
investment in CSR. Throughout the course of this study, we utilize MSCI’s global rating, 
which compares each individual firm’s ratings to all rated firms.
Table 2 reports the average overall environment (E), social (S), and governance (G) scores and 
marginal month-on-month changes in CSR component scores by year and market classification 
3MSCI’s RiskMetrics increased its coverage from 105 dimensions to 150 dimensions starting May 2013.
Year Obs. ESG E S G ∆E ∆S ∆G
2009 16,976 44.04 44.75 52.36 45.28 0.14 0.05 0.03
2010 22,995 44.91 47.30 52.99 45.22 0.28 0.07 −0.03
2011 23,626 45.17 48.58 52.47 45.75 0.07 −0.07 0.03
2012 23,484 43.24 51.38 55.05 43.91 0.20 0.16 −0.30
2013 24,351 40.17 57.79 49.74 42.58 0.90 −0.24 0.30
2014 23,391 44.44 63.51 50.81 47.18 −0.83 −0.22 −0.11
Total 134,823 43.62 52.62 52.21 44.96 0.13 −0.05 −0.01
Developed markets
2009 13,246 45.30 48.07 54.95 44.88 0.15 0.02 −0.22
2010 17,718 45.17 50.83 55.41 43.91 0.28 0.05 0.01
2011 17,605 45.65 52.61 55.36 44.63 0.06 −0.09 0.04
2012 17,411 43.66 54.35 59.15 43.27 0.17 0.38 −0.16
2013 17,345 40.08 60.73 51.59 41.00 0.85 −0.48 −0.01
2014 16,903 44.17 66.06 51.19 46.18 −0.71 −0.21 0.41
Total 100,228 43.96 55.67 54.62 43.93 0.14 −0.06 0.02
Emerging markets
2009 3730 39.57 32.99 43.16 46.70 0.12 0.18 0.94
2010 5277 44.04 35.48 44.86 49.64 0.28 0.14 −0.16
2011 6021 43.78 36.79 44.01 49.02 0.11 −0.02 −0.03
2012 6073 42.06 42.85 43.29 45.75 0.31 −0.48 −0.70
2013 7006 40.40 50.49 45.15 46.50 1.00 0.35 1.06
2014 6488 45.16 56.88 49.82 49.77 −1.13 −0.25 −1.48
Total 34,595 42.64 43.79 45.24 47.92 0.12 −0.02 −0.11
This table displays both the full sample and subsample (i.e., developed/emerging market) averages of overall 
environment, social, and governance scores and marginal month-on-month changes in CSR component scores by year 
from 2009 to 2014.
Table 2. The summary statistics of CSR component scores by year.
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for our sample. We also plot the time series average of the three CSR component scores over 
time from Figures 1–3.
While firms in developed markets tend to have better environment scores, we note that firms 
in both markets consistently improve their average score year over year. This phenomenon is 
not present when we examine social and governance dimensions. For the social dimension, 
firms in both markets appear to converge toward the middle score of 50 over time. For the 
governance dimension, we see that firms in emerging markets tend to outperform firms in 
developed markets. When we observe the marginal month-on-month changes over time, we 
see that CSR ratings for firms in both markets tend to stay constant over time and appear to 
have similar patterns of change across all three dimensions. This indicates that on average, a 
firm’s ESG score tends to stay constant, but there are also firms that experience large changes 
in ESG scores. This is consistent with the fact that firms tend to undergo periodic, substantial 
investments in CSR (i.e., rethinking energy source procedures, reconceiving manufacturing 
processes to be more sustainable, etc.) versus gradual improvements over time (e.g., [8, 51]).
Figure 1. Average environment score.
Figure 2. Average social score.
Figure 3. Average governance score.
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Figure 4. Average Tobin’s Q.
3.2. Tobin’s Q in cross-sectional regressions
To assess the CSR-firm value relation, we examine the impact of CSR on firm value, utiliz-
ing monthly Tobin’s Q (TOBINW) in our analyses. We define Tobin’s Q as the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity plus the book value of total assets divided by total 
assets (e.g., [13]). To mitigate the effect of outliers on our observations, we winsorize Tobin’s 
Q at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles. Figure 4 shows that firms in both developed and emerging 
markets generally experience similar patterns of firm valuation over the time period of 2009 
to 2014. Empirically, we estimate the following equations below:
  Tobin "  s  Q 
i,t
  =  𝛽 
0
 +  𝛽 
1
 CSR  Overall 
i,t−1 +  𝛽 2  X i,t−1 +  𝜀 i,t (1)
  Tobin "  s  Q 
i,t
  =  β 
0
 +  ∑ 
d=1
D
   β 
d
  CSR 
i,d,t−1 +  𝛽 4  X i,t−1 +  𝜀 i,t (2)
here, Tobin’s Qi,t is firm i’s Tobin’s Q at time t. CSR Overalli,t-1 is the overall index measure of CSR for firm i at time t-1. CSRi,d,t-1 is the individual dimension index measures of CSR for firm i relative to dimension d (i.e., environment, social, governance) at time t-1. Xi,t-1 is a vec-tor of firm-level controls obtained from FactSet at time t-1, which include return on assets 
(LROAW), leverage-to-equity ratio (LLEVW), capital expenditure-to-asset ratio (LCAPXW), 
cash-to-asset ratio (LCASHW), year-on-year sales growth (LSGRW), advertising expendi-
ture-to-total asset ratio (LADW), log of total assets (LASSET), and a dummy variable if the 
firm paid out dividends (LDDUM). In particular, we take special care to collect data on 
advertising expenditure as prior research has suggested that the valuation effect of CSR 
is moderated by firm visibility (e.g., [3, 52]). In order to mitigate the effect of outliers on 
our observations, we winsorize firm-level characteristics defined as ratios, namely, LROAW, 
LLEVW, LCAPXW, LCASHW, LSGRW, and LADW, at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles. We also 
include year dummies to account for yearly sources of heterogeneity. εi,t is the stochastic error term, assumed to be independent and identically distributed random variables with 
zero mean and constant variance. Similarly, we also include industry and country dummies 
to account for industry and country sources of heterogeneity. We are interested in the coef-
ficient β
1
 for Eq. (1) and β
d
 for Eq. (2), which measures whether a firm’s CSR drives changes 
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in valuation even after controlling for other firm characteristics. Here, the null hypothesis 
expects these coefficients to be zero, while the alternate hypothesis is that they are significant 
and greater than zero.
3.3. Institutional void analysis
Next, we explore how the CSR-valuation relation changes in the presence of different insti-
tutional voids related to financial, economic, and governmental institutions. To capture the 
complex and multidimensional nature of a country’s institutional framework, we collect a 
variety of county-level measures to serve as proxies for the presence of institutional voids. We 
then utilize these measures to observe the sensitivity of the CSR-valuation relation to institu-
tional voids in financial, economic, and governmental institutions (e.g., [21, 49]).
First, we collect measures related to economic development. These include the log of gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita (GDPPC) from the Economist Intelligence Unit, Index 
of Economic Freedom (FREE), and the ratio of total investment to GDP (CINV) from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to capture the rate of infrastructural development.
Second, we collect measures related to financial market development. This includes the ratio 
of bank deposits to GDP (GFDDB) from the International Financial Statistics and IMF, the 
ratio of the outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP (GFDDP) from the Bank for 
International Settlements, and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (GFDDS) from 
the Global Stock Markets Factbook and Standard and Poor’s.
Lastly, we collect measures related to governmental institution development. We follow Low, 
Tee, and Kew [18] in utilizing the World Bank Governance Indexes (WBGI). The World Bank 
constructs indices from 441 variables taken from 35 different sources produced by 33 orga-
nizations (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzz [53]). WBGI measures six dimensions of coun-
try governance, which include voice and accountability (WGIVA), government effectiveness 
(WGIGE), regulatory quality (WGIRQ), rule of law (WGIRL), control of corruption (WGICC), 
and political stability (WGIPS). Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the key variables as 
well as these institutional void measures.
To explore the moderating effect of institutional voids on the CSR-valuation relation, we con-
struct a series of dummy variables. For each measure, we sort countries according to their 
performance and assign them a value of 1 if they place in the lower 50th percentile for that 
month. The only exception is the ratio of total investment to GDP, where we assign countries 
a value of 1 if they place in the upper 50th percentile for that month. For each measure of insti-
tutional voids, we rerun our regression estimates with the inclusion of the dummy term and 
the interaction term of the dummy and CSR. This models the marginal valuation effect of CSR 
in the presence of institutional voids. Thus, we estimate the following equation:
  Tobin "  s  Q 
i,t
  =  β 
0
 +  ∑ 
d=1
D
   β 
d
  CSR 
i,d,t−1 +  β 4  IFV i,t +  ∑ 
n=1
N
  β 
n
  CSR 
i,n,t−1 ×  IFV i,t +  𝛽 8  X i,t−1 +  𝜀 i,t (3)
here, IFVi,t is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the country that firm i operates in scores in the lower 50th percentile for a given measure of institutional framework strength at time t and 
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CSRi,n,t-1 × IFVi,t is the individual dimension index measures of CSR for firm i relative to dimen-
sion n (i.e., environment, social, governance) interacted with the dummy.
4. Empirical findings
4.1. The valuation of CSR
Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the results of the cross-sectional regressions of 1-month for-
ward Tobin’s Q on CSR as shown in Eqs. (1) and (2), while Models 3 and 4 report the results 
of 2-month forward Tobin’s Q on CSR.
Observing Models 1 through 4 of Table 4, we note that our results suggest that the aggrega-
tion of CSR dimensions has a confounding effect when examining the CSR-valuation relation. 
Specifically, Model 1 shows that the firm value and the overall CSR score are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level but economically small. One standard deviation increase in the overall 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min. Max.
Tobin’s Q 134,823 1.63 0.93 0.83 5.07
ESG 134,823 43.62 28.77 1 100
E 134,823 52.62 33.30 1 100
S 134,823 52.21 32.13 1 100
G 134,823 44.96 28.40 1 100
Country-level institutional void measures
CINV 134,823 21.93 6.52 10.86 48.66
FREE 134,823 71.78 8.54 50.30 90
GDPPC 134,823 10.36 0.67 3.02 11.27
GFDDB 134,823 104.80 58.19 17.28 302.74
GFDDP 134,823 52.59 35.66 0.05 193.41
GFDDS 134,823 94.79 50.85 15.17 524.41
WGIRQ 134,823 81.60 16.36 26.32 100
WGIRL 134,823 82.09 17.76 23.70 100
WGIGE 134,823 84.28 14.75 19.62 100
WGIPS 134,823 62.77 21.25 5.19 98.58
WGICC 134,823 80.21 19.15 11.48 100
WGIVA 134,823 77.07 20.65 4.74 100
This table displays both the full sample and subsample (i.e., developed/emerging market) summary statistics for key 
variables for the time period of 2009 to 2014.
Table 3. Summary statistics of the main variables.
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CSR score is related to an increase in Tobin’s Q of about 0.0029, representing an increase of 
about 0.18% from the mean of 1.63.
Model 2 shows that the three subdimensions have different relations to the firm value. The 
environmental CSR has a statistically significant positive effect on firm value. These results 
are in line with prior findings (e.g., [2, 13, 14, 20, 51, 55]). Anecdotally, we also note that actors 
in the global business environment (i.e., policy-makers, activists, etc.) have long argued for 
the importance of environmental performance for shareholders, drawing significant atten-
tion to corporate environmental conscientiousness (e.g., the toughening of oil sands rules in 
Canada4, China’s renewed pledge to fight smog post-release of the viral documentary “Under 
the Dome,”5 and America’s continued push for carbon emission reduction6). One standard 
deviation increase in environmental CSR is related to an increase in Tobin’s Q of about 0.02, 
representing an increase of about 1.4% from the mean of 1.63.
4http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-13/oil-sands-rules-get-tougher-as-alberta-seeks-less-damage, 
retrieved on 30 March 2015
5http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-07/china-pollution-film-vanishes-as-xi-makes-pledge-on-environ-
ment, retrieved on 30 March 2015
6http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-03-19/obama-orders-40-reduction-in-carbon-emissions-by-u-s-agen-
cies, retrieved on 30 March 2015
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ESG 0.0001** 0.0002***
(2.59) (4.46)
E 0.0007*** 0.0007***
(18.97) (17.91)
S −0.0003*** −0.0002***
(−9.05) (−6.96)
G −0.0001*** −0.0001
(−2.87) (−1.53)
Obs. 134,823 134,823 126,749 126,749
R-Squared 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. dum Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ctr. dum Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table displays full sample regression estimates of 1- and 2-month forward Tobin’s Q on CSR from 2009 to 2014. 
The main independent variables are the firm’s (lagged) environment (E), social (S), and governance (G) scores. Refer 
to Appendix A for variable definitions. Regressions include industry and country dummies as indicated. Models 1 and 
2 report estimates of Fama-MacBeth [54] regressions of 1-month forward Tobin’s Q on aggregated and disaggregated 
CSR. Models 3 and 4 report estimates of Fama-MacBeth [54] regressions of 2-month forward Tobin’s Q on aggregated 
and disaggregated CSR. Standard errors are clustered on year and country. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate the significance level at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Table 4. The relationship between CSR and firm value.
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For social CSR, Model 2 reports a statistically significant negative effect in Tobin’s Q. This 
finding is similar to the prior results. Indeed, Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin [56] find a nega-
tive relation between social CSR and market value. A possible explanation for this result is 
the view that CSR has the potential to materialize as future benefits (e.g., [7, 43]) after stake-
holders recognize that firm behavior as being genuine implies that firms have to consistently 
pursue socially responsible initiatives in subsequent periods before they are rewarded (e.g., 
[26]; Greening and Turban 2000).
For governance CSR, Model 2 reports a statistically significant but economically negligible 
negative effect in Tobin’s Q. This result is also in line with prior findings (e.g., [13, 14, 24]). 
In particular, Cheng et al. [14] postulate that the weaker effect of corporate governance stems 
from the fact that the main driver of corporate governance is the country-level institutional 
structures that firms operate in.
We also include all the control variables (including LROAW, LLEVW, LCAPXW, LCASHW, 
LSGRW, LADW, LASSET, LDDUM), industry, and country-fixed effects (e.g., [57]). In unre-
ported results, we find that the effects of our controls are similar to the findings in the litera-
ture (e.g., [13, 23]). Specifically, across Models 1 to 4, we find a positive relation with return 
on assets, leverage, capital expenditure, cash, sales growth, advertising expenditure, and a 
negative relation with firm size and dividend payout.
In summary, these results provide empirical support for our first two hypotheses, whereby 
CSR creates value for the firm on average and that the CSR-valuation relation is heteroge-
neous in nature and CSR dimension is dependent, such that there is significant heterogeneity 
in valuation effects across different groups of stakeholders.
4.2. The moderating effect of institutional voids on the CSR-firm value relation
Next, we investigate how the CSR-firm value relation changes in the context of different insti-
tutional frameworks by modeling the marginal valuation effect of CSR in the presence of 
institutional voids. Table 5 reports the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Tobin’s Q 
on CSR with the inclusion of institutional framework dummies and their interaction terms as 
shown in Eq. (3).
Across all models with different specifications of institutional void (IFV), we observe that the 
CSR-firm value relation (i.e., firms in strong institutional frameworks) is generally consistent 
with our earlier findings. All coefficients except one for environmental, social, and gover-
nance CSR remain generally statistically significant at the 1% level.
In line with our expectations, we find significant differences in the CSR-firm value relation 
across institutional frameworks in our institutional void analysis. For environmental CSR, 
all regression models show that environmental CSR has a statistically significant positive 
effect on firm value for firms in weak institutional frameworks. On average, one standard 
deviation increase in environmental CSR predicts an increase in Tobin’s Q of about 0.067, 
representing an increase of about 4.1% (given the mean is at 1.63). The average effect is 
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Economic development Financial market development
IFV = CINV FREE GDPPC GFDDB GFDDP GFDDS
E 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0006***
(10.94) (7.02) (7.16) (8.09) (11.34) (18.15)
S −0.0005*** −0.0004*** −0.0005*** −0.0005*** −0.0004*** −0.0003***
(−11.32) (−10.28) (−12.22) (−12.43) (−11.36) (−6.70)
G −0.0001 −0.0005*** −0.0005*** −0.0002*** 0.0000 −0.0003***
(−1.21) (−13.38) (−15.31) (−4.02) (0.23) (−7.51)
IFV 1.0252*** −0.1720 0.2777* 0.7313*** 0.7070*** −0.1098
(8.30) (−0.93) (1.75) (5.08) (5.48) (−0.77)
E × IFV 0.0009*** 0.0018*** 0.0022*** 0.0012*** 0.0020*** 0.0003*
(11.80) (21.26) (23.70) (12.91) (27.23) (1.95)
S × IFV 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0011*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** −0.0001
(6.54) (4.65) (8.43) (7.17) (8.40) (−0.37)
G × IFV −0.0003* 0.0014*** 0.0020*** 0.0003* −0.0010*** 0.0012***
(−1.92) (8.99) (11.43) (1.81) (−4.99) (5.07)
Obs. 134,823 134,823 134,823 134,823 134,823 134,823
R-Squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ctr. dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government quality
IFV = WGIRQ WGIRL WGIGE WGIPS WGICC WGIVA
E 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0001***
(6.43) (6.86) (8.14) (6.14) (6.49) (2.86)
S −0.0005*** −0.0005*** −0.0005*** −0.0006*** −0.0006*** −0.0006***
(−12.62) (−12.56) (−13.65) (−14.26) (−13.40) (−15.88)
G −0.0005*** −0.0005*** −0.0005*** −0.0004*** −0.0005*** −0.0006***
(−14.02) (−15.34) (−15.09) (−9.22) (−13.99) (−13.60)
IFV 0.0904 0.2355 0.3498** 0.5049*** 0.1936 0.3543**
(0.54) (1.44) (2.27) (3.14) (1.15) (2.36)
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about 0.6% in the strong institutional frameworks. Hence, it indicates an increase of 3.5% in 
Tobin’s Q.
For social CSR, all regressions show a statistically significant positive effect on firm value for 
firms in weak institutional frameworks. In addition, the interaction between social CSR and 
weak institutional frameworks is positive such that the joint effect transforms the negative 
base case effect into a positive one. Interestingly, this suggests that the market recognizes the 
benefit to the firm upon filling these institutional voids and, thus, actively rewards firms who 
are working to fill them. On average, one standard deviation increase in social CSR predicts 
an increase in Tobin’s Q of about 0.015, representing an increase of about 0.9% (given the 
mean is at 1.63). In the strong institutional frameworks, the effect is about −0.9% in Tobin’s Q 
with a one standard deviation increase in the social CSR.
For governance CSR, most regressions show that governance CSR generally has a statistically 
significant positive effect on firm value for firms in weak institutional frameworks. Similarly, 
the significant and positive effect of governance CSR also suggests that the market recognizes 
and rewards firms in weak institutional frameworks who work to fill institutional voids. On 
Government quality
IFV = WGIRQ WGIRL WGIGE WGIPS WGICC WGIVA
E × IFV 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0016*** 0.0020*** 0.0025***
(23.30) (21.13) (19.42) (19.77) (20.78) (30.13)
S × IFV 0.0010*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(9.51) (11.05) (11.98) (12.00) (12.34) (15.73)
G × IFV 0.0016*** 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0009*** 0.0017*** 0.0016***
(9.40) (11.96) (12.19) (6.89) (12.37) (11.82)
Obs. 134,823 134,823 134,823 134,823 134,823 134,823
R-Squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ctr. dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table displays full sample regression estimates of Tobin’s Q on CSR from 2009 to 2014. The main independent 
variables are the firm’s (lagged) environment (E), social (S), and governance (G) scores. The interaction effect models 
the marginal valuation effect of CSR in the presence of institutional voids across 12 different measures of institutional 
framework strength. Regressions include industry and country dummies as indicated. T-Statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Table 5. The link between institutional environment, CSR, and Tobin’s Q.
Firm Value - Theory and Empirical Evidence90
average, one standard deviation increase in governance CSR predicts an increase in Tobin’s Q 
of about 0.02, representing an increase of about 1.3% (given the mean is at 1.63). In the strong 
institutional frameworks, the effect is about −0.6% in Tobin’s Q with a one standard deviation 
increase in the governance CSR.
Observing the pattern of coefficient significance, we note that our results suggest that the 
positive valuation effect of environmental and governance CSR is driven by the country’s 
economic and financial sector development, while the positive return effect of social CSR 
is driven by the country’s quality of law and government effectiveness. The degree of 
the variation is likely caused by the inherently complex and multidimensional nature of 
governance.
In summary, we find support for our third hypothesis, whereby the CSR-valuation relation 
is moderated by the institutional frameworks that firms operate in, such that the presence of 
greater (lesser) institutional voids in financial, economic, and governmental institutions will 
result in a greater (lesser) valuation effect.
4.3. Robustness tests
We perform two robustness tests. First, we examine the longevity of value creation attributed 
to CSR to test if our observations are driven by market reaction rather than material value 
creation. According to theory, CSR should create long-term value for the firm, and as such, we 
expect that there are no reversions in firm value over a longer time frame. In these specifica-
tions, we re-estimate regression specifications (1), (2), and (3) by using 3-month forward val-
ues of Tobin’s Q. Our results are robust with different forward measures of the firm valuation. 
This suggests that our observations are likely not driven by market over- or under-reaction.
Second, we examine the possibility that our findings are driven by firms in regulated indus-
tries or “sin” stocks (e.g., [3]). As such, we rerun our models excluding firms in regulated 
industries, which constitute banking, energy, insurance, telecommunication, transportation, 
and utility companies, and those under the Triumvirate of Sin (e.g., [23]), which constitute 
alcohol, gambling, and tobacco companies.
We find that our results are similar and lend themselves to the same conclusions and omit 
these results for brevity. This test provides evidence for the robustness of our results and sug-
gests that the underlying mechanism driving the CSR-firm value relation is not likely due to 
firms in regulated industries or “sin” firms.
5. Conclusion
This study advances the ongoing research on the effect of CSR on firm value by integrating an 
institution-based view with an institutional void perspective. We draw on institutional void 
theory to argue for country-level institutional frameworks as a systemic, institutional-level 
Can Corporate Social Responsibility Fill Institutional Voids?
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.76164
91
driver of CSR value creation. Our study answers the call for a greater understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms of CSR, specifically at an institutional level, and expands on studies 
investigating the valuation effect of CSR through an international investigation across both 
developed and emerging markets. Moreover, by disaggregating CSR into its three discrete 
pillars, we are able to demonstrate the valuation effect of CSR at a granular level. Consistent 
with our hypotheses and expectations, we find that CSR has a more pronounced positive 
effect on firm value in markets with greater institutional voids.
Our results have important implications for managers. For firms operating in weak insti-
tutional frameworks, we suggest that CSR may be an effective method to create firm value. 
Along these lines, firms may adopt higher standards in areas such as product develop-
ment or human resources, for example. By doing so, firms might be able to accrue valuable 
intangible assets while simultaneously filling institutional voids. Conversely, in environ-
ments with strong institutional frameworks, we suggest that managers only pursue CSR 
initiatives that are likely to add value, as our results suggest that efforts to deceive stake-
holders will likely be futile. This study also presents the disclaimer that CSR may not nec-
essarily be the silver bullet for improving firm performance. Indeed, while CSR may be a 
useful tool in a manger’s arsenal, the fundamentals of good firm performance should stem 
from solid business decisions and strategies that play to their core competencies.
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